they're bringing back all the classics

Let's say, for the sake of argument, that sometime in mid-2006 represented the nadir of American attitudes towards military intervention. This would be after Iraq had descended into the world's closest facsimile of hell, but before the effects of the "surge"-- that is to say, before Baghdad and Iraq at large were ethnically cleansed and we spent hundreds of millions bribing an exhausted populace into not fighting. You could quibble with the dates, of course. But let's say that this was about when the American populace had the least stomach for more military misadventures in central Asia.

So. Five years.

That is how long, apparently, real wisdom can survive against conventional wisdom. That is how long the virtues of discretion, probity, and restraint can exist in the atmosphere of DC punditry which is so deeply hostile to them. In five years, an unimaginable amount of human suffering and loss can be compartmentalized, excused, and promptly forgotten. That's how deep our cultural memory goes. Already, in bits and pieces, hawks and interventionists are laying the groundwork for the push to invade. Perhaps this effort will not lead to intervention in Libya. But it will contribute to their larger project, which is a culture totally acclimated to the constant projection of American military force across the globe. Savvy liberal interventionists will often argue that it is my side, the non-interventionist side, that speaks in categoricals, and that they only respond to events individually. Never believe it; they are as dedicated to the principle of American military projection, in and of itself, as anything else.

So political taste makers like Jon Chait of the New Republic begin, slowly, to build the Washington consensus. (Chait's blog is a constant reminder to us that the reasonably bright can operate alongside the almost sublimely stupid with ease.) Chait argues that the reason we are remaining out of Libya is status quo bias. Personally, I would point to the specter of dead bodies lying in the sand in Iraq, or the continuing quagmire of trying to pick winners and losers from among an unbelievably complex list of ethnic and political actors in Afghanistan. Chait is in fact arguing that it's exactly our continuing presence in Iraq and Afghanistan that makes it irrational for us not intervening in Libya, which is a little like saying that having your hands in two hornet's nests is an argument for finding more for your feet and nose. But Chait's argument is its own undoing: what on earth is the argument for intervening in Libya when we didn't in Egypt? For not intervening in Bahrain? In Tunisia, to smooth the transition? (We're really great at that.) For not invading Yemen? Saudi Arabia? Jordan? Iran?

I can tell you the reasons for not intervening in any of these, of course, and for getting out of Iraq and Afghanistan. Because democracy through military occupation is an absurd contradiction in terms. Because we cannot touch the world outside our borders without killing innocent people. Because we are not the world's authority figure. Because goddamn it, we are not nearly strong or smart or capable or moral or competent enough to succeed in such attempts, as has been proven time and time again. Chait knew that, for about 15 seconds, and then his make-the-world-safe-for-democracy righteousness mated with his perfectly typical liberal anxiety about looking weak, and gave birth to a new belief in America's power and perfect morality.

It's perfectly appropriate that TNR lead the charge, of course. It was one of the prime movers in cutting up the liberal opposition from inside during the run-up to the Iraq war, and it's thirsty for such pride of place again. Along with TNR was Slate, and like magic, more of Christopher Hitchens's self-aggrandizing bullshit appears. Hitchens, of course, skipped the stage where hawks made strangled non-apologies about Iraq, but he's always been a purer breed. Like most of them, he insists on those opposed to military interventions understanding their own culpability for bad events, while remaining blissfully, righteously immune to such blame himself. Like Ross Douthat, Hitchens divides the world between the bad and the worse-- apparently, if you aren't a neocon, you're a realist. (Two great tastes that taste like murder together.) The absurd contrivance that everyone in American politics is equally to blame for all of our problems is kind of Douthat's jam, so we'll have to forgive him for that.

Look to the usual suspects. Perhaps some will have really learned. But if you look around at those who equate blood lust with seriousness, idealism with realism, occupation with freedom, Vichy democracy with the real thing, and who think that the way to make sure everyone knows what a virile manly figure you are is to advocate limitless military commitments, you will see them working steadily and studiously. They are the type to know nothing about the world but everything about our media and politics, and one thing they know for sure is that memories are short. Their previous failed predictions are available to peruse at your leisure-- if you are ever tempted to take William Saletan seriously, read this post, one of the most astonishing texts I've ever read-- but when you are in the club, you are in the club, and they will hand you the mic over and over again.

Understand: this is all prelude to the rebuilding of the conditions within our punditry in the run up to the Iraq war and its early months. It's not enough for them to advocate military aggression. Because interventionism is so thoroughly bankrupt on an intellectual, political, and moral level, its proponents understand that they cannot merely argue for their position but must remove their opposition from the conversation entirely, as people like Peter Beinart, Bill Kristol, Tom Friedman, and many others attempted in the Iraq debate.They never really changed, the hard core eliminationists (sorry Michael!), they have always been resentful that they were asked to change, and they are eager to begin ejecting intervention critics from the realm of the serious. They will bring it all back, the redbaiting, the calls for culls, the insistence that opposition to invasion means support for dictators, the studious disdain for anyone to the left of Ronald Reagan, and the inevitable division of the liberal establishment that will empower the very worst in foreign policy.

It might not happen with Libya. It might not happen this year. But it will happen. It's their way, and it is our way, for whatever reason, to empower them again and again. So much the worse for the world, and for us.